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Modems do not expect persons to display constancy of purpose or to pursue the sons of 
purposes (ends-in-themselves) Ihal can be constantly anended to. Modernity does nOI speak 10 its 
deni�ens in these tenns. What «maners,. in modern life is that persons can chOO$e. and re-choose. 
their purposes and aClivities. Whether Ihese are trivial pursuits or not, whether the choices are 
transient or not, is irrelevant from the modem point of view. Persons of a:ood (rational) character 
are marginalised in Modernity. Of course, modems must protect themselves from the harms caused 
by .. fly by night» characters (the unreliable. the dishonest, elc.) if only to prolect lhe integrity of 
modem choice. However. modem institutions do lhis nOi via ethical norms but procedurally. 
Democracy has its electoral procedures, the market its notification procedures, science its 
experimental procedures. hospitals their supervisory checks, films and recordings their 
classification, production arK! copyright rules.l1lese procedures are .. ruies of the same .. that outlaw 
privileges. rotten boroughs. gerrymarKiers. cheating, manipulation _anything that intcrferes with 
choices people make 0.- thai intcrfcres ,,-ith the (second order) choices people makc in response 10 
others' (first order) choices. Abuses and manipulations do occur, of course. bUI not pervasively. 
More interestingly, modem societies do not rely on personal character to prevent such abuses. Thcy 
do nOt rely on what the Romans called the bona fides of the politician or the broadcaster. They do 
not rely on ethical nonns, whether of a pagan 0.- a religious kind. Even the unscrupulous arK! 
aggrandisers can play by the "rules of the game .. (most of the time at least). Once, 10 be a Christian. 
you needed 10 aCI clw'ilably. faithfully; to be a citlIen, you had to act liberll11y (by giving to Ihe 
public purse. giving your time to serve in public capacities. etc.) 0.- courageously in public. You 
were what you were via the continuous observance of norms. 1lle Christian. the citizen had to 
deliberate. 10 choose how and when to observe norms. They had a .. freedom of conscience,.. But 
choice (freedom) was not the centre of their existence. They did not pursue the goods of freedom 
(free inquiry, free market, democratic choice) but rather choices were made in the course of being 
a good citizen or a good (charitable. caring. concerned) person. Modernity oITers a choicc-cemred. 
freedom-centred (onn of existcnce. Its culture is a culture of contingency. 
"The modem person is a contingent person,.,. This fact conditions all modern ethics. To be 
modern is to live in a world of contingency. Whatever social SlruCtureS a modern inhabits. wh.atever 
goals they pursue, whatever they read or see, where-evcr they travel 10. whoever Ihey know or love. 
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\02 
there are always alternatives to those things. Whatever moderns do, they know that they can always 
do it differently. This is the modern condition. The denizens of Modernity experience an increasing 
reialiviSDlion of world views and rnorals1. Some oflhem frel about this relativism. They shudder al 
its nihilistic ovenones. Others endorse this relativism. They like the proliferation of ideas. views, 
opinions. perspectives, values. forms of life. aspirations. language games -the heterogeneity of 
sinlichkeit'. Some of them even like the idea of nihilism. Contingency, as Agnes Heller poillls OUI. 
is nOt a philosophical constrUCt. II is lhe life experience of the modern indi\'idua1. and it is a vexing. 
a threatening. but also a promiSing c)(periencc', And it is one of the few experiences [hal all modem 
men and women sharei. At least «{aJ contingent person can communicate with all Other contingent 
persons in addressing what they all share: contingency." •. 
Persons who are contingent have to «choose themselves". The life of the contingent person 
-the modem person- is not socially predetennined. Modems are nOt born into the son of 
(traditional) social arnngement where from the moment of birth the person is slotted into a social 
telo$l. Instead they are confronted from the earliest of ages with choices. with possibilities. with 
options. They mUSt prepare themselves for contingencies. Children are asked to Spe<:ulale from a 
very young age as 10 what they would like to be when they grow up. In a traditional world. this 
would not make sense. In a traditiOnal world children know what they will be as adults. They will 
be exactly as their rank. their social status. their social strata. their family tradition. detennines. In 
this selting. individual needs can only develop within fixed boundaries!. An individual is ascribed 
-allotted via birth- a certain kind of education, or office. or property (or lack of it). that is to say. 
firSI and foremost a certain position (standing. status) in the world -a place in a hierarchical chain. 
There are nonns and obligations, often very specific Nles of behaviour. that go along with thai 
position. There are the duties of one's class. 01' estate, 01' rank. or sex. There is also a specific kind 
of respect (honour) due 10 One's rank. An individual's allotment is more or less a mattcr of fate. True. 
an individual can succeed or fail in living up to the norms of their  class. their social cluster. Dis· 
honour is a possibility, as is the moral anguish of dis·honour. of being shamed hy one's peers or 
one's superiors for not having fulfilled the code of the class or community into which one is born. 
Yet the code. and all that it presupposes. is for lhe mOSt part fixed and inescapable. As Heller 
remarks, the denizens of the premodern world mobilised vast ideological resources 10 shield social 
arrangements against the awareTlCss of contingency·. They argued that social arrangements were 
natural (god·gi\"en, etc.); that birth. while itself completely contingent. fixed the fate of persons as 
rith or poor, high or low, visible or invisible -a fate that would unfold inexorably, that could not 
essentially be altered or undone by individual erfon. ambition. striving. or achievement. The course 
of f�te is irrevocable, immutable. It speaks 10 an individual's inahil it� to c hange things, 10 alter whal 
has been allotted to them"'. It is a force which tosses the individU31lhi� "ay and that way. and which 
is manifest in the structure and movement of society II. An indi\"id ual ma� Of may not be destroyed 
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by this fale. In that specific sense, Ihell: is some elasticit), in Ihe: premodern orbit. It is not 
predelennined 31 binh whether the «personality,. of a particular person will be happy with their fale: 
or whether tncy will suffer wilh their fale:; il is not fore-oroained how a penon will ada(M 10 their 
falc. Yet. however a person cJ\periences their fate. Lhey canllOt alter the hand that society deals them. 
They cannot. as the sayins: goes, "make their own fale,., II is only via the long (lfocess or 
.. modernisation» -the making of Modemity- that individuals come 10 the awareness lhal neither 
social position nor the socia] principles lhal define and allot positions are immutable. The servant 
woman knew Iha! she would nOi achieve all that she was capable of. because she had been born inlO 
service, rather than into the nobility. The modern woman knows that she can aim 10 achiel'c ali that 
she is capable of be<;ause her position in life is nOI ineKorablc. She can "go plac�s". though how f:af 
is always uncenain. In loing places. she can move from one social milieu 10 anolher. from one 
occupation 10 another, from one locality to another. She can perhaps "belter herself» -or, if nOI. 
then see lhal her daughter will. And this requires. in il$ lum. lhe end of the sense that social 
arrangemenls -who gelS whaljob and whal norms govern it. who can own propeny and whal $On. 
who gels an education and what type, eIC.- are natural. 
It was only during the Renaissance. Heller suggests, that such an awareness began to arise>:. The 
Renaissance came to the conclusion that fate in the specific guise of fonune could be mastered, at 
least for a time. by human audacity and detennination. by effort and insight. The Renaissance also 
assumed that not only could individuals rise above their allotted place. but that the very naturalness 
of social arrangements was enlirely doubtful. In a manner quile the obverse of the ancient Stoics, 
the Renaissance posed the question: how can we speak of a natural law when we can witness the 
variation of nonns between different cities? The broadening of horilOnS of the Renaissance 
culminated in an awareness of the contingency of social arrangements. lhose arrangements. as 
Heller suggests. came 10 be regarded as contingent or accidental as our binh into this or that society 
or age or stratum. Nothing in our biological constitution or generic endowment predetermines that 
we should be born into one panicular time. society or stratum lhan another". Likewise. social 
arrangements can be seen in the same light, thai is. as contingent. And where they are viewed in 
such a light. it will be concluded that any particular social auangement can just as weI! fIOI exist as 
exist". This is the modern attitude. The modern altilude is that for any social arrangemenl. there is 
always a conceivable alternative. Modem life encourages a flellibilily towards social ammgements 
that the traditional altitude rejects. At a deeper level, modems arc people who know all allout 
choice. Their world is a world of choice. Modems are choosinl beings. They can even choose their 
social arrangements. BUI what, if anything, gives meaning (rationality. consistency) to those 
choices? What is 10 Stop any modem personality unchO\lsing tomorrow what she has chosen today? 
What is lhere to suggest that moderns stick by any choice they make? Are their choices anything 
eMher than arbitrary? 
For the choices of any human being 10 be meaningful. lhey must exhibit a consistency. They 
must .. fit>o (be in harmony wilh) the decisions, choices. and IICtions that preceded them. If we "'ere 
to imagine a self wilh no continuities. we would see before us a life that made no sense. That is to 
�y. there is no meaning in II human life that lacks identity. And there is no reason in this life either. 
Reason (logos) is the surety that cenain expectations will be constantly alld continuously met; that 
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certain signs will signify roughly the same illing or event over a prolonged lime-span". Reason 
means thai a thing is identical with itself; a cenain quality and its opposite cannot be :tllribuled \0 
the same substance Dllhe same time'�. Things, aelions. words. gestures only .make sense_ \0 us 
where this is  the case. When our ex;pe<:ta\ions of identily (continuity) are confounded. human beings 
feel betrayed and deceived". When human beings tear up the continuity of their own life. they 
experience self-betrayal. Charac::ter is the expression, in 11 person. of continuity. A person of (good) 
character will act reliably, with certainly -they will be hone:o;l. or courageous. or faithful under all 
tin::umslances. When we find thai they have not acted so. we arc dismayed. In finding OUI. we 
discover «the truth,. aboullhem. In discovering .. the truth. aboullhcm. we are not diSCOvering some 
(oct aboul lhcm. or some peccadillo. or some idiosyncrasy or colorful feature of their personality. 
or some: waywardness that all human beings possess. To discover (the awful) truth is to find Ihat one 
has been deceived by the OUtward appearance of consistency. A person who is "true" is trustworthy 
and .. loyal,. LO their principles. their friends. meir word. etc .. -10 some central ,·oluel'. To disco,'cr 
the contrary is 10 discover that this person's life has been .. a lie ... that they havc betrayed the 
important things in their life. But what are those "important things,.'? Are there :lIly "important 
things» left in a world of contingency? Or does contingency render constancy (reason. identity) null 
and void'? Does the awareness of contingency represent the coming of «the end of reason ..  ? 
In traditional societies continuity meant the constant minding of the customs of a society right 
from the time of the mythological founding gods and heroes. With the onset of the A;.;ial Age, there 
was a break-through to another kind (a more intellectualised kind) of reason: the continuous 
observance of a handful of (abstract) norms became possible (at least for an «elite�: the citizen. the 
sage, etc.) even if against the grain of society. The identity of «the association of citizens. of the 
wise, etc .• was exhibited in the continuous movement of the association as 11 whole towards a 
cosmological end (telos), The telos of the virtuous actor was natural. The virtuous IIC:tor belonged 
to a cosmos, or some kind of embracing order, that was meaningful, that had a purpose continuously 
running through it. In the polis all virtuous actors were zoon politikon - their natural end was 
citizenship. In the Hellenic Age, the natural end was «tranquillity of mind •. The unwaverin& pursuit 
of !Ouch a natural end was the sign of reason. and whosoever pursued such an end could achieve a 
good life. which was to say a life rich in meaning and significance. By striving for "higher 
purposes. a person could live a life that was «heighlened>o;I' they could perform aclions that would 
stand OUI. that would be remembered. elC. In a world of contingency there is no nature. no cosmic 
telos, not even reason in History. Or at least. the only nature. the only universal thing is freedom 
(contingency). and that freedom is in itself devoid of meaning. The ancient nOlion of a natural law 
that embraced everything (and evcryone) in the universe became abbreviated in the modem world 
to a lI(){ion. first. of natural right. and then later of human right. In other words. it was reduced to 
the notion thai everyone. everywhere experiences (at least potentially) contingency. In the world of 
contingency, there is no other kind of nature. no substanth'e nature. that provides the basis for 
human identity. DQes this mean then tl'lat therc are no higher purposes for human beings? Certainly 
there are no such purposes in the world of contingency if we mean by a «hiaher purpose" the natural 
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(clos of all human beings. There is no stlch universal purpose in a world of comingency. and there 
cannot be one. So does this in turn mean that there is no longer any «truth,. in human Jives? For 
there 10 be .. truth,. in human lives, there must be $OIllC end 10 which action (condUCt) is continuously 
referred: an coo for which vinuous action is required if that end is 10 be realised or 5erved because 
virtuous action is a sign of constancy in pursuit of the end even under the most difficult of 
circumstances ... The truth� of a human life is only at issue if a person betrays the purpose(s) of their 
life's actions by inconstant behaviour. In Modernity (the age of contingency) there is no universal 
truth -unlike, say. the Greek or Hellenic poleis, or Ihe Christian City of God. But this is not to say. 
however. that there is no U'Ulh. or reason, or meaning possible in the Age of Contingency. In the 
absence of an alJ-embracing substanlive Nature (cosmos) in Modemity. truth has been pluralised. 
There are a number of (competing) truths. accessible to modem men and women:tl. None of these 
truths universally compelsl'. Put another way: there are several sourt:es of meaning in Modemityl' 
(in the same way that there are several institutional sub-systems). The consequence of this is that 
truth is also now subjective. This follows from the pluralisation of truth(s). There are several 
different kinds of trulh: one truth is the «truth fOf" you". another truth is the "truth for others",:!.'. As 
Kierkegaard concluded: the truth which edifies is Ihe truth for you. This does not mean. however. 
as Heller points ou!. that the Imth that edifies you is the truth for you alone. You may share th�1 truth 
wilh many other men and women. even all men and women. Nor does it mean lhe truth is invented 
or owned by individuals. "Truth for me" is no! identical with .. my truth»l'. Tru!h is s!ill objective: 
il stands outside (over and above) individuals. This is a necessity if trulh is to edify, for !hal which 
edifies gmbs hold of the whole of one's existence -it ..seizes. shakes. chan�es. elevates this very 
existcnce .. �. Yet the objectivity of truth does not imply. necessarily, its universality. In a contingent 
world, there is nOl jusl one lruth «there,. for the guiding of action and conduct. Even if there is one 
trulh thai edifies you, there will slill be other truths that don't edify you, but that do edify others. So 
thcn is truth merely relative to an individual's shifling (lTansienl) opinion: equivalent to whatever 
one happens 10 be thinking today? NO! at all. The pluralisation of iruth(s) does not of necessity 
render the truth that edifies me any less absolute than if it was a universal truth. As Heller says: 
.. Truth can still shine in the lighl of the Absolute for me. ahhough I am aware that il does nOi for 
(cenain) omers."ZIi. In a world of contingency. there arc several absolutes. Does this then mcan th3t 
what is true (absolute) for me, is not true (a lie. a betrayal) for others? Not necessarily: when you 
and I part it is because one of us is edified (lifted up) by something (an end, 3 purpose) that the other 
is nO! edified by. But both panies can still (inlellectually. if not emotionally) mutually recognise 
each others' truth. If there is a truth that contains all other truths, it is this. 
Moslly. the trulhs we have access to come down 10 us from past times. Thai is 10 say. the 
recognition of trulh is (mainly) a �collection of truth. Modernity produees (din:ctly) lillie to edify 
us. The g�at Romamic Modern movements of the early 19th and early 201h centuries are a panial 
exception to thisl', but even these movements arc extinguished. They are now. themselves. objects 
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of recollection. Modernit)' has been mainly good al crealing inslilUlions. nOI meanings. The kind of 
oriemalivt values (3;1;13) capable of selling in train a consistent, ooherenl pauern of social or 
individual action are largely missing from the palette of Modernil),. Cenainly there was a SCI of 
interrelaled .modem values_ -dynamism. progress, development. inllOvalion. uperimemalion. 
change. U"ansformalion. self-determination, openness-that were seen by many in the glory days of 
Modernity as "the lruth ... BUI moderns have had 10 bce the fact these ... modern val�s •. far from 
being the CTUX of a coherent form of life. proved, in many instances. destructive of meaning and 
coherence. Modern dynamis by itself so often produces meaning only by destroying il. Few can 
3CCcpt dynamis (and ilS related values) as the only orienr.alive VlIIluc today. M�ny don't even see it 
as the chief value anymore. The dynamis of High Modernity is but one possible orientative value. 
now of past times. to be recollected along with others. l1Iose others irIClude religious values (love. 
charilY), civic values (republican values), Stoical values (tranquillity of mind), epicurean values 
(friendship). These values are the product of lhe whole of Western history. "Modern men and 
"'omen are disgers. They dig OUI the past to recollect items bygonC" ...  Their search for meaning is 
retrospective because our world does nOI originale new meanings. Our spirit is spiritless. It lives on 
bolTOwed meaningltl. This is nOl lO say that poslmoderns -i.e, those who even see Modernity in il 
kind of retrospect-live nostalgically in an historical pas!. Rather. their re�OlleClion takes place by 
a kind of andacht or piety of thinkingJU. What is received and kept alive in the piety of thinking. 
Heller argues. is neither temporal nor spatial. The meanings (truths) that are recollected are not the 
meanings of living histori�al (or national or regional) paradigms (i.e. the exemplary or paradigmatic 
expressions of truths or valid values). Piety of thinking does not even imply the cult of a once-lived 
paradigm (e.g. the ancient Greek polis) nor of a once-lived thinker representative of that paradigm 
(e.g. Aristotle}!'. Rather. what the piety of thinking does is to immonalise certain values (truths. true 
�alues) e:l(\racted from various paradigmatic (and, while exemplary. still socially embodied) 
expressions of these value'5. One removes the core of timeless truth from those paradigms. and 
leaves behind the eX!fanCO<.lS and lime-bound social shell. One does nOt seek to find the truth in 
Aristotle or the Greeks. in Scna;a or Ihe Romans, as such. but to engage in and to calTy on a 
discourse about different truths that they firsl enunciated. While one might attribute cenain 
historical beginnings to a panicular discourse. the point is not to re-li,'e the past. but to think ahout 
the valid values that can be redeemed from the: debris of the pasl. The allitude of lhe. Greeks (of 
Aristolle) 10 sla�ery. 10 women. is time-bound. bUl the pursUit of the ethico·politieal is not. We e .. n 
join in a timeless eonversation aboul Ihe elhiro-political in thc same "'ay that we can Join in a 
timeless conversation with the Romans and the Stoics about the art of li"ing witoout passion. We 
can engage in con�ersation with the represenllllive figures of the past ;IS if they were with us in our 
presence. We do this through an OCt of recollecting. When this recolle�'lIon takes pillee. individuals 
receive different trulhs (different axia) with a devoutness, with 3 dCHlllon .. 1 feeling. They recolletl 
these in a Siale of self-suTTender. in a SllItc of pleasurable. admiring �urrcnder to something higher. 
Hnd lift themselves up in the ac!. Whosoever practiees this piety of thlOling. lives. spiritually. nOl 
in Ihe here and now, nor in another lime and pla<:e but in the Sp;lCel�" and timeless Kingdom of 
Meaningll. ,,In Andach! the remote becomes tbe closest. there is no oJis!�nce nor is there time, In 
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picty (of thinking) we are "presencing": there is "cternal presen(;c" (parousia). Presenting is 
immortality. Whatever we re<:cive while we are receiving becomes immortal through the piCly of 
thinking and in ;1 ..... .lJ. We can recall all !raCes of worth, all axiological treasures into the 
timelessness of the present:», Those who pr.!Clice the: picty oflhinkin&: also become immortal insofar 
as they practice it. They become immortal. not in some undetermined future or place. but immortal 
here and now through the act of presencing". 
A world like the modern world, whictl produces lillie and ever·decreasing meaning on its own. 
requires pious individuals who are devoted !O salvaging. restoring and maintaining the spirit of 
CharilY. friendship. tranquillity of mind. and any of the other axia lhal they can transfia:ure from the 
past to the enduring present of the Kingdom of Meaning. But what kind of congregation do these 
pious souls belong to? Or indeed do they belong 10 any congregation at all? What, if anything. can 
they collectively worship when there is such a diversity of axia? There is no postmodem equivalent 
of the ancient polis or the Christian community)/J. Philosophical. religious. aesthetic, ascetic ,·alues. 
and the rest, are all present. They are all re-present-cd. The contemporary «absolute spirit" is 
omnivorous. It includes everything. It is loath 10 exclude anything'l. Even if the r«OlIcction of 
meanings is incomplete. there is no forgeuing of meaning)ol . • Panldigm·pluralism is essential for the 
spirit of Modernity, yet the self-same pluralism bears witness to the elush'cness of the spiril of our 
congregation: no single and comprehensive self-consciousness of our DgC can emerge." We arc nOl 
unambiguously any one thing ... He who says that there is only one paradigm in Modernity will be 
regarded as a fool; he who says that Ihere should be only one paradigm in Modernity will be 
regarded as a madman coming from the moon or a pre·modem congregation .• · ... Olle' might add that 
anyone who says that the modem paradigm is or has ever been tbe only one in Modernity is deluded. 
The frequency and repetition of various kinds of ..celassic" and .. gothic" revivals in the Modem Age 
is evidence enough of this. Neither the modern paradigm nor any of the many non-modem 
paradigms can satisfy the postmodcrn congregation in its entirety. As Heller says. none of these 
paradigms has the privilege to aspire 10 the position of the O(only", the "real". the true one ..... None 
can be absolute for the congregalion as a whole. for the universitas fidelium. The pious soul can 
insisl lhat his and only his pandigm is true; but this insistence docs not move the congregation as 
a whole for whom there is a great variety of paradigms (exemplary embodiments of truth) to choose 
amongsr". Each pious soul (true believer). of course. putS pressure on his fellows. but he can no 
longer brand anylhing as heretic or immoral·l. So instead it is branded as «untimely". Yet the 
Kingdom of Meaning is timeless. It permits all the (immortal) values and works of the past a 
presence. an immediacy. a relevance. And in doing so makes a mockery of such charges. 
Our epoch. the postmodem one. has a distinctive self-consciousness. lIS self·consciousness is 
lhe making of the past self-conscious"'. Its self-consciousness is the consciousness of other epochs. 
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not of its own epoch. In making lhemsel�es aware of themselves via the past posunoderns, thouSh. 
do not proceed as Hegel did: the consciousness of Our epoch is not the (:ulminatklll of the 
progressive unfolding of lhe «absolule spirit,., wilh each Step (eact! his!Orical truth) subsumed in 
each subsequent step. each truth (or each paradigmatic expression of thaI truth) part of a sequential 
unfolding of the whole. wilh lhe whole encompassing and incorporating each pan in a progressive 
adventure. For us today. for postmodems. Ihere is no progression of the absolute spirit. Progress is 
hut one truth amongst many. The now "timeless" value of the modernists (progress) is bul one 
orientaliye value (axia) amongSI many. The Kingdom of Meaning is not a progressive Slate, but an 
enduring presenl (a timeless moment) between past and future. The consciousness of our epoch is 
not so much an historical consciousness but a consciousness of (different) historieal 
consciousnessef'"'. What is apparent in the Kingdom of Meaning is I1Q( so much the Truth of History 
but the redemption of different truths from the historical panorama. In the Kingdom of Meaning, 
the past be<:omes spatio-temporalized in the process of heinz .. presenced.<!. This consciousness of 
historical consciousness. this historical consciousness in and for itself, is nO{ a paradipn but rather 
the condition of reception of all paradigms-. This self-consciousness of historical consciousnesses 
has no e�planatory power and therefore cannot serve as a paradiflTl. 
Look around the contemporary congregation; some of the congregation are devoted to the 
ethico-political good, others to aesthetic beauty. others to Ihe aesthetic sublime. some to the love of 
God and their neighbour, others to the care of the self. and so on. Some (many) outside the 
congregation . of COUI"$C. are devoted to nothing in particular. But of those inside the congregation: 
can they worship together? What can they collectively worship? One thing at least they share in 
common is tbeir devotion to things of ultimate value (axia). The contemporary congregation shares 
a common effort to redeem things of value --things that have an intensity of value- from the 
debris of the past. What makes the congregationalist a conareg8tionalist is lhe readiness 10 approach 
lhe «valid value$>o and higher meanings embedded in the religious, philosophical. or ascetic works 
of the past with an altitude of .. contemplative de�"olionJO". The congregationalists also share the 
effort of continuing a conversation -and continuillg to think- about the a�ia dredged up from the 
murk ofthc past. or course. given the diversity ofaxia. much of this thought ends up heing private. 
idiosyncratic. or confined to small circles. There is no substantive discourse shared by 
contemporaries. Instead there are rival. overlapping, intcrsecting, multifarious discourses. Some of 
the congregation take up the cause of the ethi�o-political. othcrs of neighbourly benevolencc, others 
sti!! the cause of rational asceticism, etc. Some like Aristotle. others like Augustine. others like 
Seneca, and so on. Some congregationalists mix and match --a lillIe from the Greeks. something 
from the Romans. something more from the Church Fathers, etc. The blending takes place in 
different proportions according 10 the idiosyncrasies of different personalities. Each offers a 
different axiological ordering or blending. Some want to unify the good and the beautiful. the 
ascetic and the sublime; Others want 10 concentrate solely on on./! of these. and ignore the rest. Any 
of these things are possible and so far as the spirit of our times is concemed. acceptable. The 
rcccption of truth is subjective. There is no conceivable rational discourse that could lead one man 
and one woman, each with their own favourite axia or favourite ordering of tM axia 10 convince the 
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ocher that this ultimate value was valid while the one professed by the other was invalid. or that one 
ordering of ultimate values (absolutes) was right and ti1c ocher wrong, or that this amalgam of 
ultimate values was lrue. while that of the other was not. or thai the idea of amalgamating or 
unifying ultimate values was sensible while the opposite was no\. Olhers in our historical past lived 
in worlds where there was a single ultimate value (or single SCt of values) and a single "great book� 
embodying that value . •  A single Homer was enough for all the Gre<:ks. a single Torah for all the 
Jews. a single Gospel for all the Christians ... �"'. The postmodc:rn congregationalists. howe,'er. 
inherit all of the great books (and people still make cases for all the noteworthy books that are left 
out of consideration.) 
II 
There is no (single) greal book. no (single) dominant CUlture, no (single) value or set of values 
from which we C.:ln or.:lw meanin,!! today. Heller regards this as strictly a phenomenon of late. ur 
POSt. Modernity. However, late Republican/early Imperial Rome, 12th century Humanism. the 
Renaissance, and the 18th century Augll5tan Age were all periods receptive \0 a variety of "truths .... 
All were periods distinguished by the eelectie reception of the objectified meanings and "alues of 
the past. Cicero (a great eclectic thinker) coined a term for this attitude. He called it the disposition 
of humanitlS. This altitude combined a devotion to the major works of the past together with a 
scepticism directed towards the exclusiveness of their respective claims. RenaiSSlllCe humanists 
drew freely from Stoics, Epicureans, from Aristotle and Plato. from 1i1c Church Fathers. without 
insisting on the supremacy of any one school. Thomas Jefferson, a great representative of 18th 
century humanism. drew widely on Greek. Roman and Christian thought .....  
The periods of humanism were meaning-rich periods. Postmodernity, by contrast, seems a 
meaning-poor period. It appe� thin. rather than thick. in meaning. Yet it bears an obvious 
resemblance to the great periods of humanism. How can we explain the similarit), and the 
difference? The key differern::e is a rcsult of the separation of meaning and action in modern 
societies. There has been an increasingl), influential view in 20th century life that it is possible 
-through the medium of institutionalisation- to structure action without recourse to objectified 
bodies of meaning (that is. without recourse to pbilosophy. religion, art. etc.). and that 
institutionaliscd sub-systems of governments. corporations. and laboratories could be developed 
without significam reference to any rouncled picture of good human conduct. While institutionalised 
sub-systems are constructed around values --democracy. markets. science. etc.- tbese values do 
not imply any vinues (as Aristotelian, Stoic. or Christian values did). They imply nothing about 
human charll;ter. or tbe rationality (consistency) of human conduct. If there is rationality. it is purely 
systemic <fOf example. to buy when the price is tOO high Of to ignore legal procedures is irrational). 
In this circumstance. objectified bodies of meaning have been relegated to the Siberia of the 
universities where they have become products 10 be handled according to the institutional 
imperatives of that sub-syStem. In the university. of coursc. one finds personalities who are devoted 
to panicular truths. JUSt u one finds such personalities in any of the other institutional spheres. But. 
as in Other spheres, in the university. the handling of wbat is valuable is for many (most) JUSt a joh 
(a career). to bedone. competemly, efficiently, in return for income and status. according to the rules 
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and procedures and policies of the in51111.11100 but withou! any spirit. These .. sensualists without 
hean". the experu that plaj:ue modem life, have, in their role as Lhc mindel'S of the great books. 
contributed significantly 10 Ihe explosion of scholarly output thaI has occurred in Western 
universities since Ihc 1920s. Never have $0 many commentaries, so many interpretations. so many 
deconslTuclions, of the areal books been written - 10 such linle. lasting effect. The Rcnaissllnce 
humanists were great hermeneuticians, translators, and scholars, but our contemporaries. by 
contrast. lack their spirit. How could they possess their spirit when we no longer assume thDt 
meanings are imponanl for aClion. Iha! the wriling of SOme dead philosopher or emperor turned 
Stoic sage will be translated in10 human actions and deeds. and will shape human conduct? What 
.. shapes" human conduct today are institutions, not world views. 
This is by no means without consequence. The defenders of institutions say that their members 
arc much more productive when they do not have to relate their action to some objectified set of 
meanings. In the simplest of tenns. supermarkets can operate 24 hours a day. 7 days a week if their 
staff don't go to church on Sundays. The «tenured radicals,. of the 60s and 70s ger«:ration in 
the universities arc much more productive than their unlenured counterpans of the 405 and 50s 
-because they no longer have to go to pany meetings or public assemblies. They just write 
intenninable commentaries on te�15. or commentaries on commentaries. Such productivity is a 
miracle of modern life. Yet, late in the 20th century. as productivity rises. or as institutions strive 
to lift it, as corporate and government and arts bureaucracies tighten their procedures and 
«rationalise� wherever they can. the wealth of Western societies (wealth in its broadest sense) 
declines. Perhaps. looked at in the light of Ihis paradox. the old attitudes of the humanists may 
have something. after aU. to tell us, viz. ttUlt wealth·producing institutions produce their wealth not 
becausc of procedures or policies or institutional rules but because of human beings who are 
.. lifted up .. by cenain old·fashioned "truths,. (valid values) that are capable of investing action 
with meaning. and that require of their devoted adhcrents continuous observance of ethical norms 
in order to be realised -norms that give depth to human lives, that fill them out. Pemaps. as Heller 
says. the institutional base of Western societies can continue without reference to its spiritual 
sllperstl1.lClUre, But it will only do this at the cost of the continuing dilapidation of its institutions. 
In the civilisation of the West, both freedom and wealth have developed undcr the auspices of 
abstract (ethical) nonnl. WeSterners became free by learning how to apply, implement, amplify, 
etc, certain abstract nonns for t�mselves. They learnt, in so doing, to think for themselves. Less 
obviously, but as importantly. the West became wealthy because of its system of virtue. Most 
doctrines of virtue that have been significant in shaping the mentality of Westerners, let us suy 
from Aristotle onwards. have regarded wealth with some suspicion. [10 it thcn justified to say that 
vinue begets wealth? If we look al the periods of great octake-off,. in societal wealth (dassieal 
Greece. Rome of the late Republic and the Principate. tnc late medieval communf:S. tnc Italian 
Renaissance city statcs. Enaland and America in the late 18th and early 19th century) we find ,hat 
an intense interest in "classical vinue_ accompanies the creation of wealth. Why is this so. when 
the moralists (the defenders of vinue) warn against the eorruptions of wealth? It is because the 
accumulation of wealth requires the steady ohservance of nonns. This is true whether we are 
talking of wealth in a narrow sense of money and propeny, or in the wider sense of power, renown, 
collectibles. or levels of transfer payments in society. There are, in effect, a numher of measures 
of the we:..lth of a society. But whatever kind of wealth we arc talking about, to accumulatc il 
requires the traits of character we call the virtues. We cannOt explain the wealth of America today 
unless we understand the long-term effect of the �c1a$sical virlue$� of self<onlrol. temperance, 
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prudence. and so on, that pre- and post-revolutionary Americans studiously absorbed. Property is 
n01 maintained. infrastructure is not put in place. science is not endowed, museums arc n01 
supported, poverty is nOi alleviated without the delay of gratification and the sense of dUly and 
responsibility (towards oneself. or one's family or friends, or society generally) Iha1 the virtues. or 
more generally, civilisation, imbue. The translation of classical Stoic virtue into a modem idiom 
1hal then passed in10 Protestantism (Lutheranism. Methodism. ttc.) was crucial 10 England's 
induSlrial (Manchester) revolution and spurred Germany's rise 10 the ranks of the wealthy nations. 
The entablature of the West rests on the three ,olumn! of virtue. frc:cdom and wealth. Only where: 
there is a mutually supportive relationship between the three. does the West flourish. In the Age of 
Modernity. this mutual ly supportive relationship is upset. Then:: is. for a St�rI. a gradual los, of the 
power of ethical norms. The consequence is that freedom becomes the freedom to expand. The 
limits represented by norms arc extinguished. Persons come !O see themselves nOt as selvcs that 
apply and juggle different ethical norms (limits) independently of societal authorities. even in 
opposition to societal authorities and their sanCiions (and in doing so act as autonomous moral 
personalities) but as selves that musl overcome norms. either through -critical opposition ... or 
through the pretence that Incy gives themselves norms, that they are "autonomous" in the sense of 
",self· legislating». tn oven::oming norms. social aCtON imbibe the illusion that they can develop. 
mOve, accumulate infinitely. Without the encumbrance of norms. of the classical ,·irtues. the 
wealthy and the custodians of wealth convince themselves that they can accumulatc the wealth 
without limit. From this arises all kinds of self-defeating behaviours. Moreover. it suggests that the 
classical moralists were right to regard wealth. independent of vinue. as suspeCt. 
As Heller argues, modems see themselves as working to achieve and e�tend cenain 
universalise<! values. But they do nOi see the vinues as relevant to this. The consequence of this is 
that modems are left unhappy. invariably dissatisfied with their 101. In the chwical COnCeIXiOn, 
vinue is a condition of happiness, because vinue always implies some kind of temperate behaviour 
-moderation-and this in turn implies that there arc limits to the desires or aspirations or reach of 
any individual. and that ..... hen an individual reaches that limit, they can reSI happy, For moderns. 
sdf-development is assumed to be unlimited5/!. Individuals. in this selling. never feel that they Qwn 
enough. that they are able to legislate enou!h. that they kno ..... enough. Of have collected enough, or 
indeed are secure enough. As Heller puts it: «Modem man is ... Faustian man: yet he docs not 
implore the present moment to Stay unchanged as it is $0 beautifu1. Nothing should remain as it has 
heen. Aehieying something is not fulfilment: one immediately reaches OUt for the next Ihing. Should 
we cherish the hope that by achie"lng something. we shall al leviate our suffering from ",wants". 
su<:h a hope evaporates the moment we actually achieve the thin! desired. as ..... e feel another want, 
ad infinitum.,.)1 There seems liule room anywhere in the lives of moderns for cognitive feel in!s 
-feelings of satisfaction. cheerfulness, pleasure, gladness. etc. Instead the feeling structure of 
modems more often (tOO often) is dominated by .. hungers .. , "drives», "'anxieties", "urges •. by what 
Kant called «lusts"', or. put differently, by pre-rational feelings Ihal are unsDtisfiable. At least in pre­
modern soc::ietics_ glullonies or lusts -various kinds of gr«<l Of cruelty- ,,:ere (;tfler a fashion) 
5atisfiabk because bodily appetites are ultimately limited by the human organism�. In Modemity. 
even this limit is deconstl1.lctcd. Individuals develop appetites (passions) for non-corporeal things, 
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laws. knowledge. $eCur;ly. elC. -for all lcinds of un;versal;sed values Ihal h:lVe been detached from 
the cOnle);:! of classical vinue. They are driven to accumulate possessions. conlrot. infonnalion. or 
whatever, withOut any sense of limit. It might be argued Ihal it is this which creates thc great wealth 
of modern nations. But is this so? As Heller suggests. the pursuit of unlimitedness has self­
deslructive consequences!l. Self-destructiveness is evident on a number of levels. In practicol terms. 
the unlimited e);:pansion of modern industry (that is, of seiemifie knowledgc applied vill 
technologies to the control of nature) has raised «the spectre of ecological catastrophe�.j.& 
Unlimitedncss in other spheres of human activity leads to frenzies of commercial speculation. to thc 
Alexandrianism of lhe monSlCr museum builder. etc. Even mote dislUrbingly. Ihe flirtation wilh the 
unlimited. so characteristic of the Modem Age. leads in some instances 10 the erection of new and 
destructive kinds of human authority in lieu of the authority of Ihe virtues. These include Ihe 
authority of the (NietUtllean) good conscience. which is Man deified!l. and the authority of Ihe 
narcissistic conscience. In the case of the former, .. Man deified is the Law; there is no Law except 
his will; thus he abolishes all laws..". and in so doing. all limits of behaviour: in the case of Ihe 
laner. the person concentrates entirely on his own self·development to the point where he simply 
doesn't .. notiee,. others and the limits others represent for the self e'<en if only simply through their 
sheer e:.:istencel'. For both persons of «good consciencc," and of .. narcissislic conscience,., their 
pr.tctical reason is the sole arbiter of conduct. Prudence. self-control. temperateness, no longer 
condition their actions. While these are the extreme cases, they dramatise Ihe faet that modems 
generally have difficullY establishing limits. The symbolic figures of prudence. temperance. justice 
-the external authorities of classical virtue- that rcpresent limits to human beings have either 
been demolished or degrnded in Modernity. Universalised values have failed to function as an 
adequale substitute for the vinues. In the end. the temptation of modems becomes that of pursuin! 
unh-ersalistic values indiscriminately. (There are extraordinarily silly people who will say that there 
is nothing that cannot. or should IlOL be sold -that there is nothing thai cannol be collected. nothing 
that should nOl. be democralised. nothing that should not be sublidiscd.) The figures of justice. 
prudence. temperateness. etc, functioned to gently remind people thaI one could go so far and no 
funher. It was up to them. freely using their pract ical reason, 10 precisely define the boundaries of 
action. but lhey were reminded via the authority of the classical vinues thai boundaries were 
important. l1le only external authority of aoy kind that many (perhaps mOSt) modems acknowledgc 
for their behaviour is the authority of success. of gelting bigger and larger. grander and higher in 
any field of endeavour. What matters may be individual success; it may be group or corporate 
success. Yel in whatever guise. modem success is not .. measured,. in relation 10 the classical virtues. 
that is. in relation to the auainment of specific and limited objecti,·,,:s. hut rather is «measured,. in 
relalion to magnitude (quantum). 10 what Kant called .. the mathcm�tically sublime». 10 what is 
beyond all comparison great, to progress ad infinitum. to the colos�1. t., that "'hich has no definite 
end. to that which is without limil". 
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Today, "Ihe conscioLisness of the Limi! (peras) re-erm:rges."'. because people see. and are affected 
by. the consequences of actina: without any sense ofJimil or responsibility. Whether this is e�emplified 
in Ihe commercial frenzies whipped up by investment speculators or literary fren:des whipped by 
infantile aesthetic deconSlruclors is in the end irrelevant. The beSt. moSt astute of the crilics of the 
apcralic condition, ranging acrOss the political spectrum, and including Leo Strauss. Alasdair 
Macintyre, and Agnes Heller (and before her. Hannah Arendt) seek \0 restitute something of the 
authority of the virtues. All these thinkers. whatever might otherwise SCI them apan, are agreed that 
Modernity's condition of being .,after virtue,. is prob1c:matic and riddled with dangerous or repellent 
consequences. ldentifyin&: the problem is (relatively speaking) the easy pan: solving the problem is 
more difficult. and cen.ainly more contentious. If we are to talk about the "return to "inue>o we are 
confronted with a number of problems: what kind of "inue are we referring to? Is it pagan vinue? Is 
it religious vinue? Is it something ofbcxh? Is it modern vinue? Is something of all these things:' 
Agnes Heller's answer to these difficult questions is to propose a doctrine of "inue that has a 
classical feel yet is attuned to modem conditions. The dillollue of the modem and the classical in 
Heller's work has an unmistakeably humanist character. It is not an attempt to resurrect a single 
conception of vinue or uiological lruth but 10 listen attentively to a variety of ethical and 
postethical voices, and to weave out of their threads a coat that can serve (for the wearer at least) to 
keep out the chill·wind of the present·day. Heller works in a manner thaI is reminiscent of the Greek 
eklegein -in manner that selects the best from rival sySlems, and she does so with such effonless 
authority as to be able to unile the multitude of voices into a hannonic and beautiful ensemble. If 
we listen carefully, we can hear. orchestrated in her work. the gorgeous. melodious interplay of 
Stoic and Modem. as well as Aristotelian. Epicurean. Judiac and Christian pans. This choral work 
is unquestionably one of the finest. one of the richest. prodUCts of Western humanism. Such a work 
must have its idiosyncratic aspeCt. How the dialogue of pans is arranged --or who will have the 
leading pans and who will have the subsiduary ones -will always be matters about which (gre:lI) 
composers will differ. each prefering their own (unique) synthesis of parts. But there is nothing 
idiosyncratic in Heller seeking 10 make "present,. the (philosophical. ascetic. rei igioos) ethics of the 
ages. and to invite us (ethically impoverished moderns) onlO the timeless stage of this drama to 
converse and argue with the moral wisdom of the paSt (including our own immediate pasl). Heller 
hegins with an decidedly old·fashioned question: how can one be satisfied (i.e. happy) in a 
dissatisfied world?'" To regard happiness as a core value -as significant as wealth or freedom- is 
immediately to pay a homage to the world of classical virtue. But Heller does not do Ihis by 
repudiating Modernity. Her ambition is to find a way of ookling onto the gains of Modernity (iUi 
universalistic values) while making good iUi losses. How might it be conceivable to restitute 
something like a eudaimonie ethos in highly modernised settings that have for 200 years or more 
systematically denied lhe pnctical relevance or happiness to their fretting. anxious. restleS5 
denizens? What place can we (sensibly. intelligently) find ror a eudaimonic ethos in modern 
societies that rely on dissatisfaction -on the dynamics crealed by restless personalities (modem 
nomads)-- to reproduee themselves?"' tn these modern societies, life is experienced as highly 
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comingem. Whatever a person does. thcy can well imagine doing something different. or in a 
different way. Moderns have a strong sense of aheril),. and a corollary of this is that they have a 
strong sense Ihal Ihc world they inhabit is onc of unlimited possibilities. They know Ihal they are 
longer born into a fi�ed social position. and 1ha1 their life is no longer defined (except perhaps in 
residual and ever-diminishing ways) by 1M: fact Ihal they happen to have been born a panicular 
gender, race, nationality, or have inherited a eenain status. The tendency of modem societies is 10 
aoolish all caste. or caste-like, distinctions. Much of the politics of Modernity is Ihe struggle 10 cnd 
those naturalistic distinctions and the confusions and dilemmas generated as those distinctions arc 
undone and possibilities are opened up for everyone by the ernsure of traditional social hierarchies. 
Crucially. possibilities opened up are not possibilities realised. All moderns -whatevcr their 
background- now imagine much more for themselves than they will ever realise in their life-time. 
The price modems pay for their openness is dissatisfaction (unhappiness). All modem individuals 
are unhappy with their lot. They havc cJlpet:tations they cannot rcalise: they complain. they become 
agitated and frnught when thcir eJlpectations are 001. and often cannOt. be realised. They fight the 
gap that opens up bet,,-een reality and contingent possibility .. by becoming busy day and night or 
by amassing more and more wealth Of more and more power.,.l2 But such stratcgies only compound 
the problem. 
fs there any solution to this problem? One might attempt in Western societies to do what the 
Japanese have done, and superimpose a kind of neo-traditional (communitarian) authority based on 
kinship-style struclUres over modem commercial, industrial. and governmental systems that are (as 
all tmldem sub-systems are) "'growth,. (eJlpansion) orientated_ But this ends up only marrying the 
exclusionary nature of traditional social arrangements (where all avenues of life are not open to each 
and every person, even in principle) with the unlimited horizons of moderns. lbe communilarian or 
neo-traditional adaptation of Modernity is nOi at all eudaimonic in character; the limits that such 
authority represents are nOi self-imposed. but socially imposed. They arise not out of character. but 
out of society. This begs the question then: is it possible for individuals to accepl that there are 
indeed limits to individual life without those limits being imposed by (exclusionary forms of) 
traditional social authority? One way of plaCing limits on ourselves is to choose for ourselves a 
vocation in the Weberian sense of that wurd. When we do that we make an existential choice to 
become a scientist. politician, etc. and in doing so we exclude a number of contingencies from our 
life. The problem with this, Heller argues. is thai in entering one of the sub-systems or spheres of 
modem life (democracy. markets. industry, etc.) we are entering spheres that are heavily 
institutionalised. The norms of instill.ltions are procedural norms that regulate access to numbers, 
dollars, offices. etc: they are not abstract norms or virtues. A person who makes an existential choice 
to he a scientist or en&ineer does SO (initially) because they want to excel in their chosen field of 
endeavour. yet their chance to excel is almost invariably overdetermined by the vicissitudes of 
institutional life -by the levels and distribution of power, riches. prestige of their institution. their 
adeplllt$s at politicking. their good or bad fortune in steering themselves through the institution. and 
the compromises such steering may impose on their pursl,lit of excellcnce. 8cellence belon!s to the 
W()I"ld of classical virtue. It assumes the rest of that world. Excellence requires the virtues. while 
movement in the sub-systems of modern societies (markets, industry. democracy. etc.) rarely 
requires virtuous conduct. ActS of public courage, intellectual fortitude. philanthropic generosity 
and so on are still possible today. But they run against the grain of institutions. Such acts havc in � 
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way become 11 utopian horiwn against which we measure the banality of ins\ilUlional life. The 
highly differentiated character of contemporary life al first sighl offers the chance for actors to 
invest energies and emotions deeply and unrelentingly iOlO specialised activities and domains. BUI 
this prospect is more oflcn than 1'101 a mirage_ Continuity of action is confused wilh organizational 
routine: deep involvement wilh instilutional affiliation. Nobody believes that modern instilulions 
cultivate excellence: they arc, 31 best, good at eliciting a mi� of competence and efficiency from 
their staff. Pursuit of career mostly replaces pursuit of c)leelienee. and lhal pursuit for almost 
everyone is al the mercy of fOrlune, fad and fashion. What management style, whll! imellectual 
style, whal research program is in favour and how long it will lasl detennines outcomes much like 
the wheel of fortune. And for Heller -a modern Stoic- rf:liance on such "goods of fortune» is 
unattractive. This is unsuprising as Stoics have always argued that happiroess relies on our virtue, 
nOt on our fonune. For the SlOic. the condition of our happiness is that we are nOt subject 10 ",alien,. 
detenninations --that we are not subject 1 0  the vagaries oflhings beyond our control. We are happy. 
in other words, when we are self-determining. What is it then that we are always capable of 
determining for ourselves? It is certainly not what happens in institutions, or in Ihe course of our 
social life. Our health. our repute. the offices we hold. the riches we have. are all liable \0 be 
cfUci�lIy affected by innumerable factors oulSide our controL So what is in our power to determine? 
The Stoic answer is: our morals. that is. OUT moral actions towards ourselves. towardS others, and il 
is in this sense that Stoicism says that being virtuous is the coodition of being happy. If we invest 
emotionally in the goods of fortune. like celebrity or profit. we will invariably gel anxious. agitated, 
impatient. or upset because these goods are uncertain. Only by not selling too high a value on things 
which at any moment can be taken away (or that we can imagine at any moment could be taken 
away). and only by concemrating on those things that cannOt be whisked away -on our capacity 
to act morally. the stuff of our inner moral selr. the qualities of good charru:leT- can one enjoy 
happiness. contemmenl. equanimity. that is. satisfaction in a dissatisfied world. 
Consequently, for He11er. Ihe beSt existemia! choice we can make -the one that presages 
hilppiness- is the choice to be a good (decem) person. In making this choice (of all the possible 
choices we could make) we choose oursel�es and all our determinations (our strengths and 
weaknesses. our background. our upbringing. our education. our temperament. etc.) When we 
choose oursel�es we can not anymore make excuses for our actions (",I had an unhappy childhood,,) 
or blame unpleasant experiences (the unconscious memory of childhood trauma) for what we do. In 
choosing ourselves. we tum the contingency of our birth and upbringing (to be born into this family. 
of this se:o:, in this time and place, of this ethnos, to be born with this temperament. 10 have 
experienced this brulallgentle, loving/indifferent upbringing) into a destiny. That which is dCSlilled 
is irrevocable and inevitable (and thus akin to fate), yet (unlike fote) it$ inevitability and 
irre�ocability springs from choice or free willfoJ. We are able to say after we choose ourselves, thaI 
this was meant to be. and in so doing, we become self.determining: we release ourseh'cs from 
whale�er .. alien,. powers, or compulsions. are in OIJr character"'. In choosing all of one's 
detennination$, the self who so chooses is free to become a good perwn�. BUI what docs this good 
person look like? The Stoics classically talked of a person who had tlw;: qualities (virtues) of 
"'·isdom. self-control. etc .. and who acled .. according: to natUrf:" or. in terms of Zeno'S original 
6.' On ,hi: idea ofdcs,iny and r,le. _ R • ...,i .... 'IJC� /04��. (tl:ipl'" I L 
64 " PIt,lnwplty or }.I"",I •• pp. 14. 711 
6� � Pltil", ,.,I,)" OfM,,'�J .. p. t7. 
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formula. who .. acted consistently'" Consistency in moral action remains for Heller an imporlam 
charac:leristic of the good person. BUI she adds 10 the classicat Sloic fonnula that equates moral 
aclion with rational (consistent) action. She fuses classical vinue with a kind of modern worthiness. 
She is a modem Stoic. meaning thaI she is ready in her moral doctrine 10 respond to and absorb a 
modem sense of morality. in particular the sense thaI the moral scU is one who does not 
inSlrumenlalise. manipulate. or use others. Of course in the classical tradition thal SIems from 
Aristotle (i.e. non-Stoical classicism). there is [he view [hal the moral self is one who does not 
inSlrumenlalise. Bul in the Aristotelian case. the aim is [0 avoid instrumemaJising actions. not 
persons. Respect for persons as such was inconceivable in [he Aristotelian social world where 
master-servant. master-slave relationships were a fact of life. It is only in the Modem Age that 
respect for persons qua persons becomes a centr.ll moral quality". Kantian ethics was important in 
expressing this philosophically. and Heller's work exhibits an important Kantian influence. The key 
moral injunction observed by the good person. in her view. is the injunction not to use anOther 
person as a means but to treat them always as an end-in-themselves·'. The good person acts on this 
premise consistently. II is part of their character. They act on this premise in all the departments of 
their life. It is of universal applicability6A. The person of good character acts to avoid using others. 
in all circumstances, and irrespective of social sanctions69. The person who does so embodies what 
might be described as the singular modem addition to the various classical catalogues of virtue. viz. 
the virtue of decency. To !Teat persons as ends-in-themselves, we must avoid ridiculing and 
embarrassing them: we must notice their sufferings and help them achieve greater autonomy in 
themselves, To avoid treating others as means, we should avoid ",playing: .. with their affections, 
violating their body or soul. manipulating them, keeping them in tutelage. There is, of course. more 
to decency than observing these moral requirements. The good person needs to learn when and 
where to make moral judgements, when to forgive moral transgressions, how to be tactful. etc. 
Moral goodness, additionally, can have an elhico-political dimension. The good person who 
exhibits «concern .. is ready to address the causes of social injustice, to find out about and confront 
the institutiOnal and social (i.e. no longer natural) SOUItt of others_ undeserved misfortune. The 
good person who is a good citiz.en is prepared to panicipate in public acts to alter (contingent) social 
arrangements in order to remedy injUSlice. But while Heller's theory of morals accomodatcs, and 
integrates, the ethico-political (which has civic. and to some extent also Judaic. roots). like the 
Stoics. Heller insists On taking moral questions beyond issues of justice and citizenship. and rejects 
the notion that social concern or active citizenship by itself makes us morally good. Rather it is 
moral decency and respect for persons that constitutes. in Heller's , ie"'·. the core of the moral self. 
and only by concentrating all our energies and capacities on actint: dct'cntly (in any public or 
private, formal or informal avenue of life) will we end up acting in � �If·determined fashion. for 
treating others as ends rather than means is entirely for us to do or nUl do. If we are riddled with 
venomous resentments. hatreds. jealousies. amdeties. fears that m�l� us want to use and abuse 
others in order to protect or reassure ourselves that. in the face of th� " cissitudes of the world. we 
are not powerless --or in order 10 compensate ourselves for some p".,\ In)lHy or abuse that has made 
us feel powerless- then we have nOI chosen all of our determination) I including those manifeSI in 
66 Th� P" ... -u Of S/lIJm�. p. J.03. 
67 "- Phllosnphy Of MoralJ, p. 38. 
68 "- PhiloJophy OfMllrn/s. p. 38. 
69 "- P/,i/lISllph)' OfM",'alJ. p. 41. 
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our weaknesses. our disabilities. lhe pains innicted upon us, our sufferings. our torments). We have 
1'101 said: this is 1'101 simply my contingency (i1 could have been, should have been otherwise) but my 
destiny -it was mealll 10 be, and any experience of powerlessness. of being baucred by forces [ 
had no control over. makes me simply determined not (never) 10 treal OIhers in such a fashion: my 
choice. but also in  Ihis case my determination. is always to act de<:enlly. 10 respect myself and Olhers 
and 10 encourage self·determination in everyone and !O resist the inSlrumenlalising of persons 
wherever it occurs withoul resoning 10 any of the weapons of the insu\lmemaliser. 
